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DEVOLUTION
David Tuerck, Ph.D.* & William F. O'Brien, Jr., Ph.D.**
In August 1996, President Clinton signed the "Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996" (PRWORA),
landmark welfare-reform legislation that curtails benefits and shifts the
responsibility for distributing welfare benefits from the federal
government to the states.7 13 The new law reflects the public's
dissatisfaction with the federal administration of welfare entitlements and,
indeed, with the very idea of welfare entitlements.
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PRWORA embodies the concept of devolution: Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families and child care block grants replace Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlements and a host of other aid
programs. Under the law, "[e]xcept as expressly provided under the
statute, the Federal Government may not regulate the conduct of the
States."715 Thus, states now have the right to determine eligibility and
benefits and the freedom to design programs that promote work,
responsibility, self-sufficiency, and stronger families.
Among PRWORA's provisions are:
" a requirement that, with few exceptions, recipients must find
work after two years of receiving assistance;
" a five-year ceiling on assistance to families;
" built-in waivers for states that receive approval for waivers
before July 1, 1997;
" termination of welfare benefits for some legal immigrants; and
" reductions in food-stamp allotments while providing money for
child care under a separate block grant.
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In passing PRWORA, Congress reversed welfare policy that has its
roots in the New Deal and in the Great Society and successor programs.
Under PRWORA, states are free to craft and implement policies that
substantially restrict benefits traditionally enjoyed by welfare recipients.
Initially, the Clinton Administration approached the idea of welfare
reform with a view toward continuing "a strong Federal role in safety net
programs."717 By signing PRWORA and thus reversing his position, the
President made national welfare policy an extension of restrictive policies
already being fashioned at the state level.718
A notable example is Wisconsin, which had implemented stringent
welfare rules requiring private-sector or community-service work as a
condition for participation in AFDC. As national caseload levels rose,
Wisconsin was cutting its caseloads in half. As one commentator noted,
"Wisconsin's decline in dependence is the most significant change in the
60-year history of AFDC.1
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Wisconsin's success might be unique, in part owing to its early start
and in part owing to a distinct political culture and a well-organized,
mission-oriented public sector.720 It is an open question whether
Wisconsin's success can be duplicated elsewhere. Nevertheless, welfare
reform in Wisconsin and in other states is a harbinger of future welfare
policy.
While overall spending for big-ticket items such as food stamps will
be cut, PRWORA includes a fairly generous baseline. Under this baseline,
"[m]oney will be distributed to each state based on its federal funding for
AFDC benefits and administration, emergency administration, and the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program in either fiscal 1995,
fiscal 1994 or the average of fiscal 1992-94, whichever is higher."721 The
government will reward those states that are the most successful in
moving people from welfare to work and reducing out-of-wedlock births.
Conversely, the government will penalize states that are unsuccessful by
forcing them to replace federal dollars with state dollars.
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Despite anticipated savings of $55 billion over the next five years,
PRWORA hardly enjoys universal support. In signing PRWORA, the
President invoked a negative reaction from defenders of a more traditional
approach to welfare policy. One critic has condemned PRWORA on the
ground that it "does not promote work effectively, and . .. will hurt
millions of poor children by the time it is fully implemented. ,
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Indeed, cutbacks in benefits might affect negatively the health and
well-being of some, including poor children. States suffering an economic
slump may find themselves strapped for welfare funds. There is also a
strong sentiment to reconsider those provisions of the bill that affect legal
immigrants. In addition, some critics anticipate a patch-quilt effect where
different states offer aid of varying quality.
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Not all concern about PRWORA comes from defenders of traditional
welfare policy. Other critics point out that reversing the disincentives, lost
opportunities, and the social decline spurred by thirty years of heavy
government spending requires more than rudimentary caseload
reduction.724 They suggest that a walk through any inner city reveals the
utter failure of American social policy. They believe that soaring
illegitimacy rates and the emergence of a broad underclass of poor women
and children will not be turned around by a policy that pushes welfare
recipients into entry-level jobs. Dependency does not end with devolution.
Furthermore, some critics complain that devolution merely replaces one
enormous, inefficient bureaucracy with at least fifty smaller, but similarly
inefficient bureaucracies:
[T]he history of block grants is not a pretty one. Tales of
mismanagement, waste, and abuse in past or existing block
grant programs are legion. Most audits have shown little or
no increase in administrative efficiency. Although
supporters of block granting welfare have suggested that
administrative savings could be as high as 20 percent of
program costs, past block grant programs have seldom
achieved savings of more than 5 percent. And the tensions
between state and federal government were often merely
shifted to a battle between local and state governments.
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RETHINKING WELFARE
There is reason to believe that the apparent triumph of devolution over
tradition in national welfare policy might prove illusory. Economic theory
suggests that the existing debate, which gives government the job of
bringing about an "equitable" distribution of income, centers on a
particularly narrow and counterproductive approach to the question of
welfare policy.
Stripped of euphemisms about "social safety nets" and "individual
responsibility," the existing debate is about whether the reformed welfare
policy is "more equitable" or "more fair" than traditional welfare policy.
As noted, defenders of traditional welfare policy talk about the unfairness
of stripping children of benefits.726 Defenders of reform talk about the
unfairness of forcing some working mothers to support mothers who
refuse to work.727 This gives rise to a "win-lose" rhetoric of modern
politics as it relates to welfare policy. The rhetoric can be changed from
an emphasis on "redistribution," a win-lose proposition, to an emphasis on
"allocation," a win-win proposition.
If the government forces A to give money to B unwillingly, B wins
and A loses. If, on the other hand, the government creates a legal system
under which A can exchange his money for B's car, A and B both win. In
the first example, the government is redistributing income. In the second,
it is creating a framework were A and B can bring about a superior
allocation of resources. A more fruitful approach to welfare reform would
create a similar framework for allocating resources from taxpayers to
welfare recipients.
To see how this framework might be constructed, consider how the
existing welfare system, broadly defined, works. Government requires or
induces taxpayers to contribute to the provision of welfare services. These
services are provided mainly by government but also (albeit to a much
smaller extent) by private charities.
The nexus between the taxpayer and the welfare recipient consists of a
transfer and an expenditure. The taxpayer transfers funds to government,
and the government (federal or state) spends the funds to assist the poor.
In part because the federal tax code (and some state tax codes) permit
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itemizing taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions, some taxpayers
also transfer a certain amount of money to private charities, which assist
the poor.
Despite this tax incentive, the system creates a strong bias in favor of
government (as opposed to private-charity) spending on the poor. The
existing tax deduction permits itemizing federal taxpayers to reduce their
taxable income by $1 for every dollar they give to charity. The Beacon
Hill Institute estimates that individual federal taxpayers incur an average
marginal tax rate of 21%.728 Thus, the "tax price" of giving $1 to private
charities is 79".
Taxpayers can purchase a dollar's worth of private-charity spending on
the poor by making a charitable contribution of $1, while sacrificing only
79" worth of personal consumption. This represents a lower price than
taxpayers would have to pay if there were no deduction or if they did not
itemize. Nevertheless, it is still a sufficiently high price that only a small
fraction of all spending on the poor flows through private charities.
In 1994, total government spending on means-tested welfare programs
(excluding education) totaled about $329.2 billion.729 At the same time,
total contributions to private charities that provide "human services"
totaled only about $11.7 billion.730 Tax return data suggest that, of this
amount, only about 68%, or $8 billion, was reported as itemized federal
income tax deductions.
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The relatively minor role played by private charity in this broadly-
defined welfare system is partly the outcome of existing tax law. Despite
the deduction for charitable contributions, the existing tax law keeps the
"tax price" of giving high. Devolution will leave the tax price of giving at
its current level of 79".
A better option for welfare reform consists of lowering the tax price of
charitable giving and thereby inducing taxpayers to expand the role of
private charities that provide welfare-like benefits or "social services."
The most convenient and effective method of bringing about this result is
a federal tax credit.
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A charitable tax credit would permit the taxpayer, whether an itemizer
or not, to reduce his tax liability by $1 (or by some, usually large, fraction
of $1) for every dollar contributed to a qualified charity. Thus a 100% tax
credit would permit a taxpayer to pay $1 less in taxes for every dollar
contributed to charities that assist the poor, thus reducing the tax price of
giving, in the current example, from 79" to zero.
A tax credit fashioned along the principle of "budget neutrality" would
simply change the way in which welfare dollars were spent.732 For every
additional dollar contributed to a qualified private charity, there would be
$1 less in government welfare spending and $1 more in private-charity
welfare spending. So structured, a tax credit would shift the discussion
away from redistribution to allocation. Introduction of the tax credit would
presume neither an increase nor a decrease in taxpayer "effort" to assist
the poor. The sole intent would be to bring about a superior allocation of
welfare dollars, from government to private charities, and, in the process,
superior results for taxpayers and welfare recipients.
THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR TAXPAYER "EFFORT"
Treating welfare reform as an allocative rather than a redistributive
problem has its basis in recent economic writings that treat "altruism" as a
form of self interest. A brief review of the literature leading up to these
writings is useful.733
The idea of modeling altruistic behavior does not come easily to the
discipline of economics. For over 200 years, economics has been
grounded in Adam Smith's characterization of the individual as an
employer of capital who "neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it ... [but] intends only his own
gain .... 734
The strength of Smith's characterization arises from its implications in
the ability of a society to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.
Smith saw the self-interested individual as being "led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of his intention" - this end being an
assurance that production will be directed in such a way as to assure that it
will be "of the greatest value" to society as a whole.735 That people were
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self-interested was not an obstacle but a catalyst to achieving economic
efficiency: "[b]y pursuing his own interest ... [the individual] frequently
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it."
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Thus we have what later became the "fundamental postulate" of
economic behavior: consumers attempt to make themselves as well off as
possible, that is, they try to maximize their own satisfaction or "utility.1
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Producers, in competition with each other, attempt to maximize profit.
Through this process, society achieves economic efficiency or
"optimality." Profits flow to the most efficient firms, and individuals who
contribute the most to production earn the highest incomes. Society
exhausts the benefits from specialization and trade such that it becomes
impossible to increase the utility of any individual through a further
reallocation of resources without making some other individual worse
off.7
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Given so utopian an outcome, it is little wonder that economists have
sometimes viewed altruistic behavior as having almost the opposite effect
for which it is intended. Nevertheless, many people act altruistically.
Thus, any economic model that ignores the existence of such behavior is,
in important respects, incomplete. Insofar as altruism is a "public good,"
economic agents, operating on their own without prodding from
government, might not provide enough of it.
The textbook example of a public good is national defense. Because
national defense is freely available to everyone, taxpayers are likely to act
as "free riders," enjoying its benefits without voluntarily contributing
toward its provision. One argument for taxes is that, without them, people
would not voluntarily contribute to the provision of goods like national
defense which is in their interest for government to provide. The same can
be said for altruism.
An additional problem with the free-market model has to do with
"equity." According to this argument, and as noted above, the free market
may fail to generate an "equitable" distribution of income. Economists
have attempted to solve the equity problem by developing the idea of a
"social-welfare function," which explicitly assigns weights to the utility
(satisfaction) levels achieved by different persons. According to this idea,
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society maximizes welfare by achieving an efficient allocation of
resources and by bringing about the "correct" distribution of income.
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This approach suffers, however, from at least three important
problems: (1) it assumes, unrealistically, that some person or entity
(majority, philosopher king, dictator) knows scientifically how to weigh
one person's utility relative to the utility of another; (2) it invites
governments to engage in redistributive schemes in the name of
maximizing social welfare (the win-lose problem cited above); and (3) it
reduces the rewards for hard work and saving. The economics literature is
replete with articles on the "impossibility" of a social-welfare function and
on the philosophical objections to the very idea of a social welfare that
transcends the individual. 740 An alternative approach is one that
recognizes the individual as the relevant economic entity and as one that
derives utility from giving. Under this approach, the individual's utility
depends on both what he consumes and on the well-being, somehow
measured, of other individuals. Here, the problem is not to maximize
social welfare but to maximize the utility of the individual, given that one
individual's utility depends on another.
In recent years, various economists have challenged the traditional
view in economics that the distribution of income is a win-lose
proposition. They have explored an alternative view according to which
economic agents can be seen as deriving utility both from their own
consumption and from the utility or consumption of others. Gary Becker,
for example, has developed a model in which there are utility-maximizing
donors and recipients and where the donor's utility depends on the
recipient's utility.
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In this model, a transfer from the donor to the recipient makes both the
recipient and the donor better off. The donor cares only about the effect of
his transfer on the recipient's utility. What the recipient does with that
dollar is his business. According to this logic, the donor gives freely if the
utility he loses from reduced consumption is less than the utility he gains
from the increase in the recipient's utility. In this fashion, giving is based
on altruism as well as self interest. Robert Pollack has built a model in
which the donor's utility depends on the recipient's consumption of certain
goods, as opposed to the recipient's utility.74 In this "paternalistic" model,
the donor's utility rises if, but only if, the recipient consumes more of
those goods that the donor wants the recipient to consume. Yet, in this
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model, as in Becker's, the donor might derive more utility from
transferring a dollar to the recipient than by increasing his own
consumption.
To be sure, motives for giving can range from pure altruism to pure
self interest. Jeffrey Obler identifies three important motives of giving: (1)
altruism, (2) reciprocity, and (3) direct benefits.743 Altruism, selfless
devotion to the welfare of others, may arise from sympathy over the
situation of others, from a wish to do good for the sake of doing good, or
from social norms according to which helping others is a requirement for
good citizenship or from the "warm-glow" feeling that giving creates from
feelings of commitment inculcated through received values.
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A second motive is reciprocity. 745 If A helps B today, in the future B
may be able to return the favor when A needs assistance. This form of
social insurance implies a sacrifice of current consumption in return for
the implied promise that assistance will be there if A needs it in the future.
Given risk-averse individuals, this smoothing of consumption over time
may be utility maximizing.
As an example, consider a barn-raising where a group of individuals
help build one barn per year. People donate their labor freely on the
expectation that when it comes time to build their barn, there will be
ample labor to help them. Mutual-aid societies act in this way. In the
welfare system, if A helps B out of welfare by providing job training, then
B will help A by lowering A's taxes and increasing A's disposable income
and therefore A's personal consumption bundle.
A third motive is direct benefit. Here, the donor receives some type of
benefit from his contribution. This is most easily seen in subscriber or
membership organizations that provide services to their members. The
Girl Scouts and Boys Club allow children access to the programs that they
sponsor. The symphony allows one to purchase tickets to concerts.
Volunteers may obtain direct benefit from these organizations, too. A
volunteer at a hospital may receive benefits in the form of subsidized
meals in the cafeteria and receive plaques in recognition of service. By
volunteering to coach Little League, an insurance salesperson may
network and create direct monetary income.
743 See Jeffrey Obler, Private Giving in the Welfare State, 11 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI. 17
(1981).
744 See generally James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A
Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 THE ECON. J. 464 (1990).
745 See Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary
Contributions, 94 THE ECON. J. 772, 773-75 (1984).
Although there are elements of self-interest in any such model, it is
possible from these examples to reconcile the "allocative" branch of
economic theory with the idea of altruism and of voluntary giving. The
public-good nature of welfare may argue for a coercive system of taxes
that has the effect of requiring taxpayers to maintain some minimum level
of "giving." There is, however, no presumption, by virtue of this logic,
that taxpayers should fund welfare or social-services programs maintained
by government rather than by private charities.
The problem of welfare reform is not, in this light, one of fairness, but
one of determining how to make a particular level of taxpayer effort as
effective as possible in serving the altruistic goals (or not-so-altruistic
goals) of the taxpayer. The challenge for government becomes one of
maximizing the utility of the "donor" (who might also be a taxpayer).
Consider a donor (taxpayer) A and a welfare recipient B. If A must
sacrifice a dollar of his own consumption, what mechanism can cause the
sacrifice of that dollar to rebound as effectively as possible to the benefit
of A by, in turn, benefitting B?
A NEW APPROACH
Several Congressional bills would offer a tax credit for charitable
contributions. Among the most prominent is one proposed by Senator Dan
Coats of Indiana and Representative John Kasich of Ohio.746 The Coats-
Kasich bill would provide a federal tax credit of up to $1,000 for married
couples for contributions to private charities that assist the poor.
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The attraction of the bill lies in the belief shared by most Americans
that private charities are more effective than government bureaucracies in
helping the poor.74 8 In making the case for their bill, Coats and Kasich
argue:
It is important for us not only to spread authority and
resources within the levels of government, as was done
with the recently enacted welfare reform legislation. We
also need to spread them beyond government - to private
and religious institutions that have the spiritual and moral
resources absent from welfare bureaucracies. That is the
essence of this proposal.749
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A study published by the Beacon Hill Institute (BHI) reviews some of
the accounting, statistical and economic issues that the tax-credit approach
poses. 750 In its study, BHI proposes that individual taxpayers, both
itemizers and nonitemizers, should be allowed to elect a 100% federal
welfare tax credit for contributions to eligible charities for up to 25% of
their federal tax liability.7 5 ' This would have the effect of "privatizing"
means-tested federal welfare spending.
ARGUMENTS FOR A TAX CREDIT
The core argument for the tax-credit approach arises from the
distinction between "giving" and spending. When a taxpayer transfers a
dollar from his consumption to someone else's, the utility thus sacrificed is
the same whether that dollar is finally spent by a welfare recipient or, in
part, by some social-services "provider." And the sacrifice is the same
irrespective of the conditions that are attached to the expenditure of that
dollar by the social-services provider and irrespective of whether the
provider is government or a private charity.
The question, then, is by what mechanism is it possible to have an
outcome in which the utility gained by the donor and (in the donor's
judgment) by the recipient is as great as possible. Here the marketplace
provides a lesson. The principal mechanism on which the marketplace
relies to bring about an "optimal" allocation of resources is competition.
Defenders of tradition over devolution might invoke the free-rider
argument against welfare cutbacks: such cutbacks, so this argument would
go, ignore the "public good" nature of welfare, whereby taxpayers are
better off if coerced to provide for welfare expenditures from which
taxpayers themselves benefit. 752 However, the traditional welfare system
gives rise to a free-rider problem of its own: the reluctance of taxpayers to
contribute time and energy to monitor the effectiveness with which their
welfare dollars are spent. The inclination is to let someone else worry
about how their money is spent.
A. The Role of Competition
The tax credit overcomes this free-rider problem. When the taxpayer
has a range of charities from which to choose in allocating his tax dollars,
he has an incentive to inform himself about how that dollar is spent. This
puts private charities in competition with each other for both the donations
750 BHI Study, supra note 16.751 1d. at 68.
752 See Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59
AM. ECON. REV. 543 (1969).
of taxpayers and the services of welfare recipients. Charities that are
effective in attracting welfare recipients and in assisting those recipients in
ways that provide utility to donors would attract taxpayer dollars and
succeed. Those that are not would fail to attract taxpayer dollars and fail.
The injection of competition into the delivery of welfare services
would create a marketplace in which charities could try out various
methods of assisting the poor. Building on their success in helping the
poor, some charities could employ "tough love" monitoring programs,
while religious organizations could add a spiritual dimension.
B. Evidence from the States
The tax-credit option is not untested.753 For example, Michigan allows
a 50% tax credit for contributions to community foundations, homeless
shelters and food kitchens. 754 Similarly, Colorado allows a 50% tax credit
for contributions to charities within enterprise zones.755 Idaho allows
credits for contributions to children's homes. 756 Indiana has a
neighborhood assistance program.757 Kansas allows credits for those who
support AFDC recipients.
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C. Voluntarism
Just as the tax-credit option would encourage taxpayers to pay stricter
attention to how their "welfare" dollars were spent, it would encourage
them to volunteer for the charities to which they contribute.759 BHI has
estimated that its proposed tax credit would roughly double the number of
volunteers, from 3.76 to 6.95 million, for charitable organizations that
provide social services.
760
CEOs for Nonprofits in states offering tax credits believe that tax
credits encourage voluntarism and increase the effectiveness of
volunteers. In surveying these CEOs, BHI found that 90% believe that
volunteers save organizations money and are therefore crucial for
increasing efficiency; 84% believe that volunteers are necessary if they
are to fulfill their mission of helping those in need; 77% believe that they
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can count on volunteers; and 73% believe that the time spent organizing
and training volunteers is worth the effort.
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D. Private-Sector Efficiency
The economics literature suggests that for-profit private institutions
deliver government services at lower cost than government.762 Their
access to volunteers allows private nonprofit organizations to deliver
services at a lower cost than government as well. As noted, competition
between private charities for donors and for recipients would encourage
them to deliver services at the lowest possible cost.
E. Donor Response
Of several studies reviewed by BHI, all showed that a reduction in the
"tax price" of giving induces taxpayers to give more.763 Most studies
found that the amount of additional giving exceeds the loss in tax
revenue. 764 The median estimate showed that a 10% decrease in the price
of giving causes a rise in giving by 13.5%.765 In an examination of 62,422
individual federal tax returns for 1991, BHI estimated that the price
elasticity of giving was -1.12, implying that a 1% decrease in the price of
giving would increase giving by 1.12%.766
F. Crowd Out
The models of altruism explored above imply that people give more
when the recipients are perceived to be more needy. The principle of
'diminishing marginal utility of income' implies that the utility gained by
the recipient, and therefore to the donor, is greater when the recipient is
worse off to begin with. Thus, government welfare programs that make
recipients better off diminish people's willingness to give. These programs
"crowd out" private giving.
If the crowd-out factor is, say, 10%, each additional dollar of
government welfare spending reduces donations to charities providing
social-services benefits by 10". Likewise, each dollar less of government
welfare spending increases those donations by 10". The literature reports
crowd-out estimates from .5% to 100%.767
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A 100% tax credit framed on the principle of budget neutrality implies
a dollar reduction in government welfare spending for every new dollar
donated to private charity by a taxpayer. That means that there would be
two factors causing taxpayers to give more: (1) the increased utility that
recipients would receive as their dollars were more effectively applied to
the assistance of the poor and (2) a "crowd in" of donations as government
spending fell.
G. Social Pluralism
There is nothing sacred about using a tax deduction as a method of
inducing taxpayer support of private charities. In fact, the practice may be
dubious because of the deduction's undemocratic bias. Under current tax
rules, only filers who itemize, a distinct minority, can claim deductions,
thus deterring charitable giving by nonitemizers. Because of this, charities
favored by the rich, such as public television and museums, receive better
treatment than charities favored by the poor, such as churches and mutual-
aid societies. According to the late Nobel Prize-winning economist
William S. Vickrey, "[o]ne may well question whether it is sound public
policy to thus subsidize much more heavily the charities favored by the
wealthy as distinct from those appealing primarily to the poorer
contributors. ,,768
Recognizing this inequity, Todd Izzo has proposed a 20% refundable
tax credit for contributions which would not increase aggregate giving but
would level the gift-giving playing field: The government would subsidize
equally the decision of Taxpayer I to support his local church, the decision
of Taxpayer II to fund the homeless shelter, the decision of Taxpayer III
to donate to the Salvation Army, and the decision of Taxpayer IV to
provide for public television.
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(Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui, eds., 1993); Russell D. Roberts, A Positive Model of
Private Charity and Public Transfers, 92 J. OF POL. ECON. 136 (1984).
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AND PUBLIC POLICY 31, 54 (Frank G. Dickinson, ed., 1962).
769 Todd Izzo, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2371, 2386-90 (1993). (Izzo uses four classes of
taxpayers to illustrate the current disparity between the preferences of the low-income
and high income taxpayers. Taxpayer I earns less than $5,500, incurs no tax liability, and
donates to his church. Taxpayer II earns $20,000 and incurs tax liability, but does not
itemize deductions and donates to the neighborhood shelter. Both bear the full cost of
their contributions and receive no tax reduction. In contrast, Taxpayer III earns $32,000,
incurs tax liability, and itemizes deductions while donating to the Salvation Army.
Another itemizer, Taxpayer IV, earns $100,000, incurs tax liability, and donates to public
television. Taxpayers III and IV receive a reduction in tax liability because they made
contributions. "This allocation of decision making is inequitable. If individuals are to
have the power to decide how public money is spent, then that power should be allocated
without regard to an individual's income.")
According to Peter J. Wiedenbeck, additional justification for a tax
credit lies in the following:
[T]he deduction for charitable contributions must
ultimately find its justification in nontax social policy
considerations . . . . First, a tax incentive to encourage
private support for the services traditionally provided by
charitable organizations may be necessary in part because
of constitutional restraints of government action ....
[S]econd, the best available economic research indicates
that the tax deduction is efficient. That is, deductibility
increases gifts to charity by more than it decreases tax
collections . . . . [T]hird, the charitable contribution
encourages cultural and associational pluralism.
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[emphasis added].
CONCLUSION
During the last four years, welfare reform has captured the imagination
of both federal and state policy makers eager for a solution to more than
six decades of failed policy. While PRWORA responds to taxpayer
impatience over these policies, it will not rescue the poor from
dependency. It suffers from a misplaced emphasis on the redistributive,
win-lose elements of conventional welfare thinking.
The tax credit option represents a shift in the rhetoric, from a focus on
redistribution to a focus on allocation. Considered in the context of
traditional economic theory, expanded to incorporate the role of altruism,
the tax credit option represents a win-win proposition for taxpayers and
recipients.
A review of the existing literature and recent findings by the Beacon
Hill Institute suggest the following reasons for adopting the tax-credit
approach as an alternative to the traditional entitlement approach and the
current trend to devolution:
The tax credit injects competition into the delivery of social services,
replacing the existing government monopoly with a system in which many
private charities would compete for taxpayer dollars and for recipients.
" Some states already have modest tax-credit programs in place.
" The tax credit encourages giving and voluntarism.
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" In part because it encourages voluntarism, the tax credit would
permit private charities to provide services at less cost than
government.
" The "crowd out" effect of government spending, along with the
documented effectiveness of tax incentives in encouraging
giving suggest that the tax-credit approach would encourage a
transfer of dollars from government to private charities.
" Tax credits are superior to tax deductions on grounds of social
pluralism.
The tax-credit option deserves consideration in the debate over welfare
reform that is sure to take place in the years ahead. For reasons already
well known to students of fiscal federalism, that debate did not come to an
end with the last year's triumph of welfare reform.
